The Metaphysics of Morals and the Case for Just War Theory

Abstract

In the previous chapter we focused closely on the aspects of Kant’s discussion of the right to go to war which demonstrated the widest possible divergence between the account in Perpetual Peac. and the account in Metaphysics of Morals. Published (and probably written) at slightly different times they clearly do not in every respect follow the same line of argument. Those writers who suggest that Kant takes a view that favours just war theory tend to emphasize the argument presented in Metaphysics of Moral. at the expense of the view presented in Perpetual Peace. They do so to show that the strong opposition Kant evinces in Perpetual Peace to the doctrine of just war, as advanced by the international lawyers of the period, represents an anomaly in relation to his view on war as a whole. But a strong case for continuity can be made between the interpretations offered in the two works, and even (perhaps less strongly) a case for a lack of conflict between the two. Matthias Kaufmann has presented an interesting line of argument on this issue in his article ‘What is New in the Theory of War in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals?’ 1 . He acknowledges that ‘at first glance, there are many new elements in the Right of Nation. contained within the Metaphysics of Moral. when compared to Kant’s writings on similar topics.’2 Kaufmann has particularly in mind here of course the contra just war arguments of Perpetual Peace. however he believes the ‘frictions are mitigated considerably if we look closely at the key ideas’.3