Abstract
Abstract Some foundational assumptions of the generative paradigm in linguistic semantics are outlined. It is argued that they do not suffice, on their own, to license the drawing of metaphysically immodest conclusions about the assigned semantic values on the basis of narrowly semantic premises. It is concluded that if we seek to establish metaphysical conclusions from semantic starting points, we need additional premises not provided by narrowly linguistic semantics alone. The possibility is bruited that we may be furnished such premises from some style or other of broadly philosophical semantics and metasemantics, setting the stage for a subsequent discussion of various alternative metasemantical theses about the proper dialectical role of semantic analyses vis-à-vis metaphysical inquiry.
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