The Metaphilosophy of Common Sense

Abstract

The primary purpose of this chapter is to set out as clearly as possible a general account of the metaphilosophy of common sense. To be sure, the account provided here does not appear in all details in the work of any single thinker in the common sense tradition. It does, however, incorporate the central pronouncements of the likes of Aristotle, Reid, Moore and other central figures of the tradition, and it is certainly consistent with the general tenor of their thought on these matters. Nonetheless it has been necessary first to gather and then to meld these pronouncements into a coherent whole in order to arrive at a complete metaphilosophy. Following the lead of Sellars, the account begins with a general statement on the nature of the “philosophical enterprise” from the common sense point of view. I then go on to consider the methodological approaches it sanctions as well as what one might call “the common sense project” as a whole. To add some flesh to these otherwise abstract bones, I end with a provisional list of putative common sense beliefs in order to provide the reader with some concrete examples.KeywordsCommon SenseSpecial SciencePhilosophical ProblemDefault PositionPhilosophical ActivityThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.