The Media Rent-Seeking Society: Differences in Democratic and Autocratic Environments

Abstract

Attention of the public is scarce and channeled by the mass media. This creates opportunities for informational rent-seeking. Governments are in a favorable position for grasping media rents as they can regulate the media. However, the extent of regulation and, thus, the agenda-setting power are limited by their effects on the mass media credibility. In democratic environments the government will choose informal ways like collusion with cooperative journalists and formal measures like ownership of public broadcasters and subsidies pretending to ensure the variety of opinions. Autocratic governments on the other hand favor more formal and direct forms of controlling the flow of information. The concept of the media rent leads to the predictions that government activities affect the credibility of the mass media, that the chief executive's time in power has an impact on media repression, and that democratic and autocratic countries differ in their instruments to gain the media rent. Cross-sectional and time-series evidence will be presented.