The Mechanism of American Foreign Policy

Abstract

SINCE the tragic days of June 1940, the American people has experienced a revolution attitude towards international affairs, and has become painfully conscious of its responsibilities. Secretary Marshall, recalling that the past nations have risen to positions of leadership usually over long periods of years which enabled them to adjust themselves to the requirements of their situation, pointed out a recent address the unique case of the United States which in a single decade . . . has been projected into a position involving responsibility greater, perhaps, than any nation modern history.' Since the Secretary's observations will serve very well as the keynote of my paper, I quote him further: Before this abrupt transition, we could indulge our prejudices and feelings regarding foreign relations with the knowledge that what we said or even did would not be immediately determining factor one situation or another. Foreign affairs were of secondary importance to our people. We could afford the role of critic, which is for those who do not bear immediate and primary responsibility for the development of events. We enjoyed the great advantage of having strong friends who not only shared our concept of civilization but, being close to the scenes of trouble, furnished the first line of defense of our common society. Having noted the complete reversal of this state of affairs and the emergence of the United States as economically the strongest Power, Secretary Marshall continued: This position of pre-eminence demands on our part a full realization of the degree to which future events depend upon what we say and upon what we do . . . The fact is, the decisive factor for good the present circumstances of Europe will be the action of the United States. I have drawn at such length upon Mr. Marshall's address merely to stress the realization of the American position the world today. It is not my purpose to enlarge on this subject, but rather to raise the related questions: to what extent is our machinery for foreign policy formulation and implementation adequate to deal with our new responsibilities, and what changes are already under way to meet the new requirements? In this matter the American public is by no means oblivious or indifferent. There has been, during the past generation and especially during the last decade, a veritable avalanche of writing on all phases of the subject. Most of it has been outspokenly critical, but some at least constructive. But there is a distinct feeling that, to borrow the words of President John S. Dickey of Dartmouth College, our procedure for dealing with foreign affairs is an unholy mess.2