The mechanism for joint and individual accountability based on the multilayered ‘principal–agent’ relationships: taking the implementing of ‘Peaceful Zhejiang’ as an example

Abstract

In China, a significant issue remains as to how to ensure accountability and what kind of accountability should be built under China’s multilayered ‘principal–agent’ relationships. In implementing ‘Peaceful Zhejiang,’ a comprehensive approach to development in this province, accountability needs to be shared among Party and government organizations across different levels of government, as the project aims to bring together efforts across Party and government organizations. Such joint and individual accountability, however, also raises the risk of ‘conspiracy’ among organizations at lower government levels, weakens the capacity to differentiate responsibility, and to evaluate performance, and may undermine motivation for successful implementation of Peaceful Zhejiang. Higher-level local governments, if able to reduce information asymmetry, adjust work priorities continuously, and improve assessment criteria and associated rewards and punishment, can enhance the incentives provided by the assessment system. With both pressure from the top-down and the risk of ‘conspiracy’ from the bottom-up, however, local authorities are prone to be anxious and languid, and may do the least required and leave things to chance or do it at any cost. To break through the multilayered ‘principal–agent’ relationships, China needs to create some horizontal accountability mechanism to build more responsive governments based on delegation of power.