The meaning and purpose of political/parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other options of non-parliamentary democracies in the world.

Abstract

The article considers and systematizes the meaning, functionality, optionality and consequences of political, as well as parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other options of non-parliamentary democracies in the world. It is stated that the opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies should be considered more broadly, but also in a slightly different sense than within parliamentary democracies. In particular, due to the fact that it is not an alternative to the executive, but is a manifestation or a mechanism of checks and balances in the conditions of a “rigid” separation of powers. In addition, it is found that the political opposition in presidentialism is determined by various institutional and political factors that can act as veto players, in particular by federal system, bicameral parliament, type of party system, qualities of the head of state, etc. This “broadens” the spectrum of political opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, but does not strengthen parliamentary opposition in such political systems. Thus, it is proven that parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies is significantly more limited than in the case of parliamentary democracies, but in general political opposition here is much more “broader”.