Abstract

This paper revisits the family of MDP Procedures and analyzes their properties. It also reviews the procedure developed by Sato (Econ Stud Q 34:97–109, 1983) which achieves aggregate correct revelation in the sense that the sum of the Nash equilibrium strategies always coincides with the aggregate value of the correct marginal rates of substitution. The procedure named the Generalized MDP Procedure can possess other desirable properties shared by continuous-time locally strategy proof planning procedures, i.e., feasibility, monotonicity and Pareto efficiency. Under myopia assumption, each player’s dominant strategy in the local incentive game associated at any iteration of the procedure is proved to reveal his/her marginal rate of substitution for a public good. In connection with the Generalized MDP Procedure, this paper analyzes the structure of the locally strategy proof procedures as algorithms and game forms. An alternative characterization theorem of locally strategy proof procedures is given by making use of the new condition, transfer independence. A measure of incentives is proposed to show that the exponent attached to the decision function of public good is characterized. A Piecewise Nonlinearized MDP Procedure is presented, which is coalitionally locally strategy proof. Equivalence between price-guided and quantity-guided procedures is also discussed.

Highlights

  • According to Samuelson (1954), public goods are characterized by nonrivalness and nonexcludability

  • Since the appearance of Samuelson’s seminal paper, the prevalent view was that the free rider problem was inevitable in the provision of pure public goods: once the good is made available to one person, it is available to all

  • This paper aims at clarifying the structure of the locally strategy proof planning procedures as algorithms and game forms, including the MDP Procedure

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Summary

Background

According to Samuelson (1954), public goods are characterized by nonrivalness and nonexcludability. Champsaur and Rochet highlighted the incentive theory in the planning context to reach the acme and culminated in their generic theorems Most of these procedures can be characterized by the conditions, the formal definitions of which are given, i.e., (1) feasibility, (2) monotonicity, (3) Pareto efficiency, (4) local strategy proofness and (5) neutrality. This paper aims at clarifying the structure of the locally strategy proof planning procedures as algorithms and game forms, including the MDP Procedure They are called locally strategy proof, if players’ correct revelation for a public good is a dominant strategy for any player in the local incentive game associated with each iteration of procedures. The task of the MDP Procedure is to enable the planner or the planning center to determine an optimal amount of public goods As an algorithm, it can reach any Pareto optimum. The results below cannot be applied to the model with many public goods

The family of MDP Procedures
The structure of locally strategy proof procedures
Price‐quantity equivalence in planning procedures
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