Abstract
We analyze the canonical market game. There are ℓ commodities, a single inside money, ℓ markets in which commodities are exchanged for inside money, and n consumers. Each consumer's strategy is the nonnegative vector of his commodity offers and his money bids. Given endowments and sufficiently large offers, the set of interior Nash equilibrium strategies is finite and non-empty. Hence the set of interior Nash equilibria in strategy space is parametrized by the ℓ n-dimensional vector of offers. In allocation space the manifold of Nash equilibrium allocations has generic dimension ℓ n–ℓ, which is also the dimension of the set of feasible allocations.
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