Abstract
Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind thesis have been the so-called “coupling-constitution fallacy” and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b). According to Adams and Aizawa, extended cognition is a logical possibility, but is not instantiated in our world. Following this view, they defend a “contingent intracranialism,” based on a specific mark of the cognitive that they propose. In this paper I intend to show that neither criticism is effective against the extended cognition thesis. In particular: the mark of the cognitive proposed by Adams and Aizawa does not secure contingent intracranialism;the coupling-constitution fallacy criticizes extended cognition on precisely the point the theory was intended to defend: namely, that the best way to individuate cognitive systems, given a minimal mark of the cognitive, is to rely on coupling relations between agents and environmental resources.
Highlights
“Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” This is the starting point of the reflection by Clark and Chalmers (1998) on the extended mind
Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind have been the so-called “couplingconstitution fallacy” and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b)
In this paper I have analyzed two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended cognition thesis: the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive, and the coupling-constitution fallacy
Summary
“Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” This is the starting point of the reflection by Clark and Chalmers (1998) on the extended mind According to their view, the boundaries of our mind can vary depending on the activities we are engaged in. When we use the external environment as an extension of our space for thinking, some of our cognitive processes can be considered extended: when we use pen and paper, for instance, to perform a multiplication, following well-known heuristics learned at school (Clark, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010a,b, 2011; Wilson, 2004; Wilson and Clark, 2009). Sometimes our minds are bound to our brain structure: when we dream, for example, or when we think without interacting with the external environment
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