Abstract

AbstractThe question moving the inquiry of this chapter is the following: how is solidarity used in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice? Section 13.2 presents a legal-theoretical discussion aimed at ascertaining what exactly is meant by a ‘face of solidarity’, that is, what could the ‘legal nature’ of the concept be. Building upon these theoretical foundations, the chapter zooms in on the case law in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Sections 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5 consider solidarity as a value, as a principle, and as a rule, detailing the applicable case law. Speaking of solidarity as a ‘value’ means that it transcends specific doctrinal domains such as migration law, labour law, human rights etc., and it offers instead a standard of behaviour to strive for and on the basis of which to adopt or interpret other rules. Solidarity is also a principle in the sense that it guides the application or interpretation of other rules, and in this sense, it is akin to a value (the differentiation is defended in the next section). Finally, solidarity is a rule insofar as it provides the solution to a legal controversy in a specific instance, by creating an obligation for the EU legislator or for the Member States.KeywordsEuropean Union lawArea of Freedom, Security and JusticeSolidarityMigrationCourt of Justice of the European UnionLegal theory

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