The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf

Abstract

The Abu Sayyaf is an organization which has left a trail of mayhem and murder in the southern Philippines for more than a decade. It has gained international notoriety through several high profile mass kidnappings. This article looks at how the Abu Sayyaf has managed to survive and at times prosper despite the state’s efforts to eradicate it. By using organizational analysis the paper demonstrates how the Abu Sayyaf has developed structures and processes which make it such a deadly force. The organization has succeeded in gaining considerable fit with the environment in which it operates. In January 2002, the armed forces of the Philippines and U.S. launched Operation Balikatan on Basilan, an island in the southern Philippines which is about 50 kilometers long and 35 kilometers across at its widest point. Approximately 5000 Philippine troops were joined by 500 from the U.S. along with their advanced military hardware. The objective of the operation was to seek and destroy the Abu Sayyaf group comprised of a mere 50 to 100 men who had been engaged in kidnapping and other violent activities on Basilan and adjacent areas. Why was there such an enormous state reaction to the small Abu Sayyaf organization in this remote island of the Philippine archipelago? According to official sources in both the Philippines and U.S., the Abu Sayyaf were both ‘‘terrorists’’ and ‘‘bandits’’ who posed a major threat to the security of the Philippine state and who were probably linked to international Muslim terrorist groups. Their kidnapping exploits in 2000 and 2001 gained them international notoriety while in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, they were placed on America’s ‘‘most wanted’’ list of terrorist organizations. That the Abu Sayyaf has been able to generate such a huge deadly response to its activities is testimony to its success as an organization built on the use of violence. This paper departs from the normal political science and strategic studies perspectives on terrorism by undertaking an organizational analysis of