The Making of a Method: A Historical Reinterpretation of the Early Parsons

Abstract

ion. 5. Positivism/non-(post-, anti-) positivism. A breach with positivism was no more required. is thus not unusual to find early Parsons embracing analytical theory and upholding, simultaneously, methodological model of natural sciences and, with it, search for uniform laws. The interpretive literature runs to opposite extremes on question of Parsons's positivism because it takes now analytical theory, now natural-scientific model as main focus, when to Parsons two strands were one. It is natural sciences, he wrote generalized [analytical] theory present sense-the sense required for progress of social sciences-has been most highly developed past (1937b, p. 623; 1937c, pp. 18-19). Among attractions to him of analytical method of neoclassical economics was its closenesss] form to th[is] natural science model; and by developing an equivalent method for sociology, he hoped to situate his field methodological company of sciences like theoretical physics, chemistry and general biology (1937b, pp. 301, 598). Commentators who claim that Parsons viewed social and natural sciences as distinct method contradict his stated position here (see 1937b, pp. 595, 622). 14 Misleading, as well, have been those scholars who acknowledge Parsons's belief unity of method, but contend that by conjoining this to a program of analysis and theory, he produced a synthesis of positivism and other traditions that transcended former. The historical evidence suggests that Parsons did no such thing. To champion analytical theory within his context was not to surpass positivism, but simply to throw off comparatively atheoretical brief for approach that was furnished by those like institutionalists and to align oneself with a more up-to-date and nuanced case on positivism's behalf. Parsons said as much his neglected writings on Pareto. In Parsons's view, Pareto set out to make economics and sociology positive sciences on model of physical sciences; he did 12 Common sense itself, Parsons suggested, is an amalgam of aphorisms and statements about what experience has taught men to expect (1936a, p. 359). 13 His adherence to this point of view should make one cautious of accepting prevalent opinion that, matters of method, early Parsons was a Kantian-at least insofar as is equated with epistemological activism on part of scientist. is true that, toward end of his career, Parsons welcomed attention by scholars to his 'epistemological activism' (1978a, pp. 1353-54; see also 1974a); but prior to this, nowhere, according to Bershady (1973, p. 72), had Parsons ever acknowledged followingn] Kant's procedure. In Structure, Parsons set his own position apart from (what he curiously called) empiricism, stating that in Kant's time view of analytical abstraction [advocated Structure] was not known (1937b, pp. 474, n. 1, 597; see also 1965, p. 180). Even amid his late positive assessment of Kant, Parsons insisted that he would modify Kantian stance so as to salvag[e] concept of empirical ordering (1978b, p. 400). 14 In Parsons's view, the differences [between natural and social sciences] all lie on a substantive level sense that there are basic substantive differences between concrete phenomena involved behavior of stars and of human beings (1937b, pp. 591, 623). To neglect these latter differences, to ignore human voluntaristic domain of ends, values, and like-the domain so vital campaign for sociology-was to succumb to extreme positivistic thinking; and this, of course, was a brand of (positivist) thought that Parsons strongly opposed. Treatment of this substantive issue, however, lies outside bounds of