Abstract
Between 1950 and 1956, after a struggle for liberation from Dutch colonial rule, roughly half a million former freedom fighters returned to Indonesian society. Some of the freedom fighters turned into insurgents or joined politico-criminal bands; others sought recognition as veterans of the National Revolution collectively claiming material and immaterial benefits from the state. Given the militancy and political potency of former freedom fighters, the Indonesian state attempted to accommodate them through employment schemes and veteran legislation. In this co-option strategy, that was only partial successful, the central army command played a crucial political role. While the army leaders accommodated the major veteran associations, they also significantly reduced the room for formal political activity. This process of the making and taming of the veteran moved Indonesia into the direction of an authoritarian state with the army counterbalancing the President and a newly arrived political rival: the Indonesian Communist Party.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
