The Making and Melting of the “Iron Rice Bowl” in China 1949 to 1995

Abstract

The socialist regimes are commonly perceived as insensitive to the economic problems of overmanning and inefficiency arising from the iron rice bowl. This paper argues that the People’s Republic of China, as a socialist regime, was not insensitive to these problems. However, the economic rationality of the planned economy was prioritized on macro‐planning balances rather than efficiency at the unit level. The national economy was considered as a chessboard and the regime was the player to move labour from one square to another to maximize overall efficiency through strategic positioning. The iron rice bowl was a part of the national industrial manpower policy and it was considered more important than the growth and efficiency of individual enterprises. Even during the economic reform era, the regime guarded against the disruption of overall economic balancing, and measures were taken to protect workers from dismissal.