The Maintenance of Cooperation: Expectations of Future Interaction and the Trigger of Group Punishment

Abstract

Public goods are characterized by the nonexcludability: those who do not contribute can still consume the good. This characteristic can create problems for the creation and maintenance ofpublic goods. However, under some conditions, when the group members know that they will be making numerous decisions together, public good provision is likely. We consider the effects of discountparameters or expectations offuture interaction, and trigger strategies that involve group punishment. The experimental tests demonstrate the importance of both factors on the first decision period. After group interaction, the effect of the discount parameter diminishes. However, when long punishment periods are mandated, cooperation started at high levels and remained relatively high. Public goods, a type of social dilemma, characterize situations in which people must up something valuable for the possibility that others will do the same and therefore all will be better off. Such dilemmas shape our everyday life: civil rights movements involve contributions of effort and time and sacrifices that can be tremendously costly, but also immensely beneficial to a great many; academicians must give their time to help create an atmosphere that enables freedom of expression, for if nobody contributes, such an atmosphere does not