The Luxembourg Affair

Abstract

In the years following the separation of Belgium, the Dutch adhered to the policy of playing a passive role in world politics with steadily increasing determination. Foreign ministers soon learned that any participation in power politics, no matter how minor the part, would be quickly rebuked by parliament and public opinion. This was, for example, the experience of Foreign Minister Jhr. P. van der Maesen de Sombreff (1862–1864). At the time of the Polish Rebellion in 1863 the great powers sent notes to Russia expressing disapproval over the manner in which the rebellion was suppressed. At the suggestion, it was generally assumed, of Napoleon III the Dutch minister of foreign affairs had also sent a note. Members of the States-General first learned of it through the press. When interpellated, the minister admitted that a note had been sent and justified it on humanitarian grounds. An attack on the minister’s act was led by Groen van Prinsterer, the leader of the Anti-revolutionary Party, who branded the note as an act of intervention, a departure from the policy of neutrality. He solemnly warned the foreign minister of the danger of becoming involved in a Napoleonic war. The foreign minister survived this parliamentary storm,1 but this good fortune was not to be repeated.