The <i>MARO Handbook:</i> New Possibilities or the Same Old Militarism?

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In recent years some human rights scholars, journalists, activists, and policy makers have advocated the use of military intervention against violent mass human rights violations by governments or other perpetrators in societies with governments that are unable or unwilling to prevent the violence.1 This push is a response to the failures of outside powers that appeared militarily capable of intervening in, for instance, the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. While many such advocates also recognize the importance of long-term prevention efforts and non-military options, they argue that there will be cases in which prevention efforts will fail and violent mass human rights violations against vulnerable groups will become a serious threat, if they do not actually take place. In such instances, military intervention from the outside is the legitimate last resort.2 Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Tampa Library at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. Recommended Citation Theriault, Henry C. (2011) MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the Same Old Militarism?, Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 6: Iss. 1: Article 3. Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol6/iss1/3 The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the Same Old Militarism? Henry C. Theriault Department of Philosophy, Worcester State University In recent years some human rights scholars, journalists, activists, and policy makers have advocated the use of military intervention against violent mass human rights violations by governments or other perpetrators in societies with governments that are unable or unwilling to prevent the violence.1 This push is a response to the failures of outside powers that appeared militarily capable of intervening in, for instance, the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. While many such advocates also recognize the importance of long-term prevention efforts and non-military options, they argue that there will be cases in which prevention efforts will fail and violent mass human rights violations against vulnerable groups will become a serious threat, if they do not actually take place. In such instances, military intervention from the outside is the legitimate last resort.2 The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy of Harvard University’s Kennedy School and the United States Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute offer the 2010 Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook. The handbook was intended not only as a step toward the broader recognition of the purported need for military intervention but also as a crucial step toward the concrete capacity to intervene successfully. Designed for the United States military, the authors indicate that, with suitable adjustments, the handbook could be used by other forces as well. The report is meant to guide higher level decision makers and field commanders who might be required to run a mass atrocity response operation (MARO) through the planning process of the intervention and to guide adjustments as the intervention unfolds on the ground. There are two general questions against which the handbook can be evaluated. First, assuming that military intervention in the kinds of situations discussed in MARO is morally right, does the manual fulfill its goal of providing useful guidance for accomplishing a successful intervention—that is, an intervention that saves some or all of the victims from violence and ensures long-term safety for them and stability for the area that they inhabit? The second question is more complex: given the concrete realities of the US military and the impacts of military intervention, is military intervention itself justified and, if so, under what conditions? At first glance, this second question would seem to carry us beyond the scope of the handbook, which is concerned with what should be done once the decision to intervene has been made. But, as will become clear below, given the concrete specifics and history of the US military and the ways in which it has been used, the issue of how to intervene is inseparable from the question of whether it is morally right to intervene, even if in MARO the latter is disregarded. What is more, the authors of MARO—Sarah Sewall, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin—hope that this unofficial guide, as the handbook Henry C. Theriault, ‘‘The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the Same Old Militarism?,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 7–31. 6 2011 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.7 is presented, will be adopted officially by the US military. Such adoption is predicated on the acceptance of MAROs as acceptable military missions, and thus the Handbook implicitly advocates for this acceptance, if its internal content assumes that acceptance. Both questions generate the evaluative points made in the present consideration of the handbook.