The Losing Battle of Goliath: the Failed Management of an American Alliance and the Asymmetric Intra-Alliance Negotiation under the ANZUS Dispute (1984-1986)

Abstract

ABSTRACT Why do superpowers at times fail to manage intra-alliance disputes? Existing studies have argued that superpowers enjoy advantageous positions and easily manipulate opposition from their lesser allies. Yet, the ANZUS crisis, in which the United States could not modify New Zealand’s Nuclear Free Policy (NFP) incompatible with the ANZUS treaty, poses a puzzle. Using historical documents in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, the article claims the United States’ strategic restraint failed in intra-alliance negotiation between the United States and New Zealand. Because the United States anticipated that its punitive reactions would harden New Zealand’s position and hurt the United States’ reputation as the leader of the Western alliances, it had avoided extremely harsh measures against New Zealand. Ironically, this restrained behaviour of the United States reassured the policymakers in New Zealand that the costs and risks caused by the NFP would be acceptable and consequently pushed them to escalate New Zealand’s position to the point that the United States had no choice but to expel New Zealand from the ANZUS membership. This case study implies that restrained reactions by stronger allies within an intra-alliance negotiation can provoke the unexpected backlash of dissenting allies.