The Lopsided Dynamics of Competitive Elections

Abstract

In this paper, we present the contours of a theoretical model which endeavours to capture some important current dynamics of regime change. The model suggests that, in the aggregate, structural factors constrain the presence of electoral competition increasingly less. We attribute this to two dynamical components, both of which are based on contemporary studies of regime change. First, the international dominance of the Western powers in the post-Cold War period means that most developing countries are affected by a persistent external pressure to democratize. Second, this factor is backed up by a particular process of social learning which has convinced conservative elites that electoral competition does not jeopardize their economic interests. However, we argue that these factors have only impacted certain structural variables, such as Modernization and Neighbor diffusion, but not for others, such as Islam and oil rents, thus creating an asymmetrical pattern. We examine these propositions about an asymmetrical pattern through a tentative empirical analysis, which tends to corroborate our expectations. On this basis, we lay out some implications for present dynamics of democratization.