The Logical Structure of Kinds

Abstract

Do crimson, scarlet, and maroon stand to red as various brain states stand to the mental state of pain? No, says Eric Funkhouser, who sharply distinguishes the determinate–determinable relation from the realizer–realized relation, arguing that they are mutually exclusive. Red is a determinable, with crimson, scarlet, and maroon amongst its determinates. Pain is multiply realizable, by a range of brain states. Or so it seems; Funkhouser is reluctant to commit to specific concrete cases of multiple realization, arguing that it is for science, not armchair philosophy, to investigate the real nature of pain, for example. The philosopher's role is to articulate the possible structures and relationships, both for the inherent interest of this project, and with the hope that this may help clarify some methodological issues. But, like Funkhouser, I will use the toy brain state/pain example to illustrate realization. The book title is initially distracting, since (i) it is not obvious why structures based on determination and realization relations are in any sense logical rather than metaphysical, and (ii) properties, rather than kinds, are fundamental to Funkhouser's ontology. Logic versus metaphysics needn't detain us here, but properties versus kinds deserves our attention.