The Logical and Methodological Foundations of the Theory of Law of Leon Petrażycki in the Context of the Analytical-Phenomenological Tradition

Abstract

The author reflects on the common understanding of the methodological foundations of the psychological theory of law as grounded in philosophical positivism. Furthermore, Petrazycki’s legal and methodological investigations are interpreted in the context of the analytical-phenomenological tradition associated with such thinkers as Frege, Brentano, and Meinong. Special attention is paid to the comparison of the epistemological ideas of Petrazycki and the analytical phenomenology of Husserl, as presented in his Logical Investigations. The author identifies the numerous similarities between the logical and methodological ideas of Petrazycki and the analytical-phenomenological tradition in general philosophy, especially the analytical phenomenology of Husserl (inter alia, the intensional concept of class, or the thesis of the incommensurability of theoretical and empirical knowledge). The result of this comparison is the conclusion that Petrazycki found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations the ideas, which to a great extent correspond to the ontological assumptions of his theory of law. In the last part of the chapter, the ideas of Petrazycki’s disciples—who tried to develop his theory of law in the phenomenological direction—are discussed.