The logic of suicide terrorism: does regime type affect the choice of targets?

Abstract

ABSTRACTPape [2005. Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. New York: Random House] famously argued that suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce democracies. However, also several autocracies have been targeted. This article argues that suicide attacks as a strategy of coercion rely on a general expectation of being able to raise the cost of conflict for the target state. Raising costs may require attacking different types of targets depending on the regime type one seeks to coerce. While the cost of conflict can be raised for democracies by attacking civilian targets, it can be raised for autocratic regimes if the targets are chosen strategically, for example, by focusing on actors that are particularly important for the government. The article then analyzes statically the risk of government targets being attacked with all incidents of suicide attacks in the Global Terrorism Database, 1981–2014. The results corroborate the hypothesis that the more autocratic the regime, the more likely are suicide terrorists to attack government rather than civilian targets.