Abstract
This paper considers an electoral equilibrium between two party coalitions. Each coalition is composed of two factions called activists and opportunists. Activists are interested in announcing a policy as close as possible to their ideal policy and are ready to contribute with vital electoral resources to die one’s own party coalition. Opportunists are interested only in winning elections and need the activists’ contributions to enhance their party valence. Thus, the two factions of each coalition negotiate on both policy platform and activists' contributions. Results show that, in equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between policy position and activists’ contributions must be the same for the two negotiating factions inside party coalitions. Furthermore, greater activism inside parties leads to policy divergence.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
