The logic of non-enforcement: Entanglements between state and non-state law in Bangladesh

Abstract

This article investigates the ways in which state and non-state laws become intricately intertwined in practices of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh. Instead of inhabiting separate legal universes, I show how state and non-state laws become entangled in what I call the logic of non-enforcement. People in rural Bangladesh frequently appeal to state courts—yet they frequently do so not in order to get binding and enforceable verdicts, but to alter the outcomes of a non-state justice institution like the shalish in their favour. This leads to unexpected patterns of political accountability: people expect local elected politicians to intervene in the state courts, stop pending cases and bring them back to community-based resolution in non-state fora. Elected politicians are thus held accountable according to their ability to prevent the enforcement of state laws. At the same time, state agencies frequently bring legal cases to trial in non-state courts. I conceptualise this blurring between state and non-state laws, its underlying social dynamics as well as its normative justifications as a distinct ‘logic of non-enforcement’. According to this logic, state courts decisively affect the outcomes of processes of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh while state laws nonetheless are systematically not enforced.