The Logic of Interoperability

Abstract

INTRODUCTIONSince 1918, Australia has joined the United States in every one of its major conflicts: World War Two, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Australia's enduring commitment to the alliance has led to a renewed focus on joint operations. The new maxim within Australian defence circles is Interoperability with the US military has become the keystone phrase for many issues relating to Australia's procurement, strategy, and doctrine. Yet the other phrase used equally as often is self-reliance. Australian strategic planners simultaneously view the US as an indispensable and unreliable ally. Although Australia has always been at America's side, Australia was disappointed by the unenthusiastic response of the US to the 1999 East Timor crisis. As such, the underlining logic of is to hedge between dependence and self-reliance.Firmly resting among these mixed strategic motives is the F-35 J°int Strike Fighter program. The Australian government's decision to acquire up to 100 F-35 fighters is not only the most expensive and complicated military purchase in Australia's history but is also Australia's biggest step yet toward interoperability. Historically, the US has been Australia's country of choice when searching for military equipment. Indeed, barring one exception, since i960, every fighter purchased for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has been of American origin.1 Yet the F-35 is the first Australian defence purchase with the explicitly stated intention of improving with the US.Although within Australian Defence Force (ADF) circles, the concept of has primarily come to be associated with the level of analysis, there is a competing view of interoperability. This second definition concentrates on integration. It is based on the aim to mesh the worldviews, objectives, and national interests of close allies. In turn, politico-strategic interoperability aims to promote a greater division of labour between the nations in regard to procurement, training, and deployment. While operational interoperability implies a nation's preparedness to respond to a broad spectrum of contingencies, politico-strategic interoperability results in a narrowing of the spectrum of contingencies that a nation prepares to respond to, with the knowledge that the nation's partner is prepared to respond to the remaining contingencies.This article holds that a more effective US-Australian alliance should attempt to shift the logic of from the to the level. Taking the F-35 as an example, I argue that Australia would never be fully self-reliant in a confrontation with a major regional power. Furthermore, Australia's contribution of airpower to an American-led coalition involved in a major regional conflict would be, at best, token and strategically inconsequential. Hence, instead of pursuing high-end capabilities, such as the JSF, Australia should dedicate itself to preparing for low- and mid-range conflicts. This focus would ease the US burden of regional peacekeeping, internal security assistance, and stabilization operations in the Asia-Pacific region. In exchange, Australia would invite a greater American presence that might include naval and air assets. This approach would exploit each country's competitive advantages and be the best means of advancing the alliance-partnership into the 21st century. For this to occur, however, the US would have to take dramatic steps toward allaying Australia's historically ingrained fears of abandonment.In this article I discuss the logic of as expressed by Australia's decision to acquire the F-35 JSF. In the first section I provide a historical overview of Australian strategic thinking, and how this thinking has led to the integration of as a keystone concept. …