Abstract
Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases—predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic.
Highlights
Consider the following principle for epistemic justification: If one has justification for believing P and one has justification for believing Q, one has justification for believing P ∧ Q
Logical principles can provide an invaluable resource for assessing theories of justification—an alternative to assessing such theories according to their predictions about hypothetical cases3
This paper will have met its primary aim, though, if this method of assessment be taken seriously—if these further logical principles be deemed worthy of serious consideration, alongside conjunction closure
Summary
This is sometimes called conjunction closure—if it is correct the set of propositions that one has justification for believing, at any given time, is closed under the operation of taking conjunctions. Is the proposition that one has justification for believing...: JP JQ J(P ∧ Q) This inference will be valid in any so-called ‘normal’ modal logic1—though this, on its own, is no argument for accepting conjunction closure (I will detail a brief argument for it ). This principle has been the subject of considerable discussion amongst epistemologists, and features prominently in the lottery and preface paradoxes
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