The Little Dragon and the Bear: Russian‐Taiwanese Relations in the Post‐Cold War Period

Abstract

Following its expulsion from the United Nations (UN) in 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) commenced efforts to stem the tide of its allies' defection to the enemy camp, the People's Republic of China (PRC). This task, however, proved to be somewhat challenging. While in 1972, 42 states recognised the ROC against the PRC's 85, by 1988 the ratio of 22:136 was rather unfavorable to Taiwan. Addressing Taiwan's increasing diplomatic isolation, President Lee Teng-hui's (Li Denghui) flexible diplomacy emphasized substantive-rather than official-ties with the states which did not recognize the ROC, without abandoning its goal of winning new allies. The systemic changes in East Central Europe in 1989 raised hopes in Taipei that close ties could be established with former Communist states, which hitherto had shunned the ROC. These hopes proved justified when the Czech Republic emerged as Taipei's supporter in international forums and when Macedonia recognized the ROC (January 1999). It was, however, the break-up of the Soviet Union (USSR) in December 1991 that offered the greatest opportunity for the ROC's flexible diplomacy. Among fifteen states that emerged from the ruins of the USSR, Russia was the largest, most populous, richest in natural resources, and--due to its military power and permanent seat on the UN Security Council-enjoyed critical influence in global affairs in general and East Asia in particular. Russia's substantive ties with Taiwan could have frustrated Beijing's reunification goal by force if necessary, while aiding Taipei's efforts to reenter the international community. For the same reasons, Beijing was anxious to obstruct communicationofficial or substantive-between Moscow and Taipei. As a result, a triangular pattern of relationships emerged, with China and Taiwan locked in positions of enmity and both seeking Moscow's vital support.