The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?

Abstract

Ronald Reagan has proposed that the president be given the power to line-item veto appropriation bills in order to reduce the deficit and to discourage wasteful spending.' Throughout his administration, President Reagan has been thwarted by Congress in his attempt to eliminate certain established programs from the federal budget. He has also had to accept appropriation bills containing both items he desired and pork barrel items desired by members of Congress.2 If President Reagan possessed the item veto, then his power vis-a-vis Congress would have been enhanced in these cases.3 Although this reform is discussed in the literature,' little empirical or comparative evidence is available as to whether the line-item veto actually works to curtail spending and promote efficiency in government. It is usually argued that the line-item veto, through its use or the threat of its use, mitigates logrolling and pork barrel appropriations and makes government more fiscally responsible. However, a chief executive could also use the line-item veto as an instrument to promote partisan and/or executive interests. Such usage would be most likely to occur where the chief executive confronts a legislature wholly or partially under the control of an opposition party. Although such use of the veto would reduce expenditures, fiscal restraint would be only a symbolic goal. This article examines the line-item veto in state governments to determine whether it is used as an instrument for fiscal restraint or an instrument of partisanship. The line-item veto is available to 42 (or 43 depending upon interpretation') of the 50 state governors. Although an investigation of the veto power in state government is a legitimate and valuable end in itself, research findings from the state level may also inform discussions about incorporating this power into the national Constitution. State budgeting is, of course, different from national budgeting in that state budgets are often required by constitutional provision to be balanced. Nevertheless, similarities between the two levels of government regarding budgeting are more common than differences. Both levels of government are subjected to conflicting pressures for the expansion * Is the line-item veto used as an instrument for fiscal restraint or as an instrument for partisanship? This question is addressed through a survey of legislative budget officers in the 50 states. The data suggest the item veto is more an instrument of partisanship than of fiscal restraint.