The limits of the European Union’s fisheries agreements as sustainable development instruments: The case of Cape Verde

Abstract

As an important instrument of the external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy, the European Union tends to promote the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) as doubly beneficial, since they grant access to foreign waters for its vessels, while also opening channels of technical, scientific, and administrative cooperation for the development of the fisheries sector in partner countries. However, the Republic of Cape Verde, which has signed fisheries agreements with the EU since 1990, has shown consistent deficiencies that these treaties were supposed to tackle, such as the monitoring of illegal activities by foreign vessels or enhancing the capacities of the local artisanal and semi-industrial fleets. By collecting and comparing data on the initiatives developed under the EU-Cape Verde SFPA and the country’s performance in fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goal 14, which aims to manage and protect marine life and ecosystems, this paper discusses Brussels’s potential and limits as an international development actor for the fisheries sector and oceans governance, seeking to determine the level of efficiency of these treaties in promoting sustainable development in maritime spaces. An enhancement of financial and technical cooperation is observed between both parts of this specific SFPA, but the transparency and sustainability of the actions undertaken are still viewed as flawed, compromising Cape Verde’s national strategies to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda.