Abstract
This chapter seeks to reconstruct how the late Stavros Tsakyrakis formulated liberalism's commitment to neutrality. It shows that Tsakyrakis championed not only the practical usefulness of neutrality in deciding cases but also its explanatory potential in elucidating why and how rights matter. However, the more he sharpened his conception of neutrality, the less absolute it became. Eventually it came to express a political ideal that in some areas imposes robust duties on government and in others allows more room than is sometimes thought for the expression of collective identity. In order to elaborate this dualism and focus the discussion, the chapter refers to a recent decision of the US Supreme Court that would surely have engaged Tsakyrakis, American Legion v American Humanist Association.
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