The Limits of Literalness

Abstract

The great majority of modern theories on metaphor seem to follow a variety of versions that adhere to the mainstream interpretation which respects the original Greek meaning metapherein (meta = beyond; pherein = to bring), that is, they claim that there is a transfer of the primary or habitual meaning. However, there are some contemporary challenges which question this double status of metaphorical meaning. On the one hand, there is the idea that metaphor is »saying one thing and meaning another« (Barfield, 1962: 55), that it »involves the pretense that something is the case when it is not« (Turbayne, 1962: 3), or that metaphors are »calling other things to mind« (Searle, 1979: 113), thus implicitly stating that there is one dimension of meaning that can be called literal which is carried over into the non-literal domain. On the other hand, there is a denial of this traditional view which is best pronounced by Donald Davidson, who is convinced that there is no transferred or special metaphorical meaning apart from the literal one. Both views provoke a closer inspection of the status of literalness. For if there is a transfer of literal meaning, we have to be able to explain the mechanism of this particular form of semantic matching; and if literal meaning is all that counts, it is especially important to attempt an anatomy of literalness. That is why this opening discussion on literal meaning should not be understood as a mere introduction or a preparatory stage for a more sophisticated analysis of metaphoricity; literalness already contains within itself a great portion of the complexity of the subject and is probably the most delicate part of the whole problem.KeywordsLiteral MeaningBackground AssumptionLinguistic CompetencePreparatory StageSubject WordThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.