Abstract
Aristotle’s theory of physical objects, hylomorphism, has resurfaced in contemporary metaphysics. In its current version, hylomorphism is proposed as a general theory of mereology, its purview extending beyond material objects to chemical composites, events, and non-physical mathematical, linguistic, and musical objects. While I agree that hylomorphism works well in all of the newly proposed applications, it fails as a theory of properties and their parts. I show that this is the case and then theorize about why this is so.
Published Version
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