The limits of human knowing a critical examination of John Hick’s epistemology

Abstract

This thesis attempts to engage with the material of John Hick, in light of recent scholarship, specifically focusing upon his epistemological foundation. It is committed to examine Hick and his critics in order to address the question: Does Hick’s epistemology form a solid foundation for his pluralistic hypothesis? To achieve this, the thesis will offer insight into how John Hick employs Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical insights as a basis for his epistemology, and how Hick develops these theories of cognition into a foundational aspect of his major philosophical schema. It seeks to understand how Hick’s hypothesis relies on his epistemological claims and how they are employed as a basis for his pluralistic hypothesis. This thesis attempts to describe, and subsequently critique, Hick’s basic assumptions by addressing three main questions: 1) What are John Hick’s epistemological assumptions that he employs as a foundation for his philosophical exercise? 2) How do they function as a foundation for his pluralistic hypothesis? 3) Is Hick’s interpretation and application of Kant’s epistemology well-reasoned and valid? By doing so, this thesis will establish that Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis is irretrievably linked to his Kantian base. Hick’s soteriological, Christological, and philosophical conclusions will be established as a natural result of his epistemology. As such, this thesis establishes that any acceptance of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis must constitute an acceptance of his epistemological assumptions. Furthermore, it demonstrates that an acceptance of Hick’s epistemological claims offers a strong defence against critiques of his ultimate philosophical conclusions.