The limits of hedonism: Feldman on the value of attitudinal pleasure

Abstract

1. Among theories of the good life, hedonism is often regarded as both the simplest and the least plausible. It is a simple theory in that it identifies one good only pleasure as having prudential value.1 But it is implausible because of this simplicity, as a result of which it is accused of supporting unduly narrow judgements about prudential value, holding that only a life of sensual contentment is valuable, and overlooking the fact that our lives go better or worse for us if we acquire other things we desire, or if we obtain intrinsic goods such as knowledge and friendship. Fred Feldman's Pleasure and the Good Life sets out to demolish both these widely held theses about hedonism.2 Hedonism, Feldman shows, is not the simple theory its critics claim it is, nor is it implausibly restrictive in its range of judgements about the good life. When properly understood, it is a malleable, or, as he puts it, a "plastic" theory that allows of different interpretations, some of which accommodate claims about the good life that have traditionally been seen as paradigmatically non-hedonist, and indeed, anti-hedonist. His argument unfolds in two main steps. The first step consists in arguing that what has prudential value,3 according to the hedonist, is not, as is often thought, sensory pleasure, that is, pleasure as a feeling or tingle or a sensation, but attitudinal pleasure, that is, favourable attitudes towards some state of affairs such as enjoying it, being pleased about it, being glad it is happening, being delighted by it, and so on (p. 56). Sensory and attitudinal pleasures are distinct phenomena, although they can be related. It is possible for someone to experience attitudinal pleasure in having sensory pleasures we often enjoy having