The limits of Empire: Australia, eastern appeasement and the drift to war in the Pacific, 1937–41

Abstract

Despite Australia’s regional security interests being intimately involved in the Pacific War, scholarship often portrays the nation as uninvolved in preparations for the imminent regional conflict. Rather, Australia ‘suffered from a chronic lack of self-reliance’, looking instinctively to the British Empire and the security it afforded. This article proposes that in the years 1937–41, the Australian government – first under Joseph Lyons and then Robert Menzies – recognised both the immediacy of the Japanese threat and the limitations of imperial defence plans and accordingly responded with a concerted policy for the coming regional conflict. The principal focus of this article is Australia’s position towards Japan and the implied pragmatic appraisal by Australia of the strategic value of diplomacy in maintaining regional stability. In the context of this growing assertiveness, this article also considers broader tensions in the Australian–British relationship, tensions centred on each nation’s respective and divergent position towards Japan. In this way, this article is more than just an examination of strategic appraisals, rearmament and diplomacy. It seeks to comment on Australian geopolitics, its relations with great powers, and the challenge of balancing national interests.