Abstract
This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism. Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however, is insufficient for theoretical and practical reasons. Conventions may be justified in virtue of their coordinative functions, but often qualify for posterior empirical criticism as research advances. Accordingly, industry bias does not only threaten existing conventions but may impede their empirically warranted improvement if they align with industry preferences. My empiricist account of standards of inductive risk avoids such a problem by asserting that conventional justification can be pragmatically warranted but has, in principle, only a provisional status. Methodological conventions, therefore, should not only be defended from preference-based infringements of their coordinative function but ought to be subjected to empirical criticism.
Highlights
In 2018, more than 68% of all R&D funding in the United Kingdom stemmed from private donors (National Office of Statistics 2020), a number that still appears moderate when compared to 76% in China and 78% in South-Korea (Eurostats 2019)
If non-epistemic considerations are so ubiquitous in scientific practice, how can we identify epistemic standards on which “industry bias” infringes?
I have offered a criticism of methodological conventionalism
Summary
In 2018, more than 68% of all R&D funding in the United Kingdom stemmed from private donors (National Office of Statistics 2020), a number that still appears moderate when compared to 76% in China and 78% in South-Korea (Eurostats 2019). The RCT case offers a counterexample to such a view as it illustrates that inductive risk equilibria that are set by conventionally accepted methodologies can be epistemically criticized beyond their ability to facilitate coordination As it stands, conventionalists appear to be unable of accounting for the purely empirical target of such criticism even if we (quite artificially) separate them from the problem of industry bias. As an account of the justification of methodologies choices, it does not license criticisms of purely empirical (as opposed to coordinative) flaws in conventionally justified standards of inductive risk. In line with defenders of the VFI, permissive empiricism maintains that an effective elimination of non-epistemic risk decisions is generally warranted This normative aim, is not achieved through specific forms of communication, but by means of posterior empirical criticism of conventional standards. The former epistemic danger is captured by industry bias in Wilholt’s sense, while the latter might be dubbed structural industry bias, as it is the result of structurally flawed standards
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