Abstract
This article argues that Habermas' account of deliberative democracy rests upon a set of untheorized decisions about language and communication derived from his account of formal pragmatics. Assessing the limitations of his formal pragmatics thus demonstrates why the account of deliberative democracy is incapable of adequately addressing asymmetries in power, generated by economic and bio‐political discourses. I contend that disagreement is intrinsic to communication, that agreement represents a temporary hegemony, and that rationality is better conceived of as itself implicated in regimes of power, rather than as an external means of offering a critique of these regimes.
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