The Limited War Controversy: U.S. Policy toward Communist China's Intervention in Korea, Summer 1950-Spring 1951

Abstract

Four months after the Korean War broke out, the United States found itself fighting the Chinese Communists. The ensuing U.N. debacle caught Washington off guard. As then Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented, Peking's advance into North Korea ”was the greatest disaster which occurred to the Truman administration.” (1) The military confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), many agreed, consolidated anti-Communist ideology, militarized and globalized U.S. foreign policy, and prevented rapprochement of the two countries for two decades. Searching for causes of the fiasco, President Truman and his key advisers lay most of the blame on the miscalculation, ambition, and insubordination of U.N. Commander General Douglas MacArthur. The general (and his subordinates as well as supporters), on the other hand, argued that Washington politicians confused military with political objectives, thereby depriving his command of victory. (2) Recent scholars, transcending the ”Truman-MacArthur controversy” interpretation, largely agree that the differences between the theater commander and his Washington superiors were not so great. Instead of being pivotal on ”marching to the Yalu” and bringing about Peking's intervention, these scholars argue, MacArthur merely strengthened the preexisting inclinations of the administration. (3) Searching for reasons for the U.S.-PRC confrontation, they criticize the administration as a whole for being too cold war oriented and too arrogant in dealing with Peking. The latter's repeated warnings that it would intervene if U.S./U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel were ignored. The last opportunity to settle the conflict early, that is during the period the Chinese Communists broke off contact after the success of their initial attack, was lost. British scholars in particular stress London's efforts to bring about a diplomatic settlement, only to find Washington aloof to the idea of negotiation with the Communists. Instead, the U.S. elected to isolate and to coerce Peking into submission. Economic sanctions, the U.N. aggressor resolution, and sporadic threats of military retaliation, these historians maintain, all demonstrate irreversible U.S. hostility toward Communist China. (4) Studies, on the Communist side of the story also reach a consensus that Peking's decision to intervene was dictated by Washington's hostile actions rather than careful strategic design. (5) But was the U.S. so arrogant and reckless that it totally ignored Peking's warnings of intervention? Did it adopt an adamantly hostile attitude toward the PRC after the latter's entry into the Korean conflict? Was the idea of negotiation with the Communists absolutely unacceptable to the policymakers? How close were they toward recommending an expansion of the conflict into China? In order to modify and/or supplement existing answers to the above questions, this paper intends to analyze the deliberations of Washington planners on how to handle Peking's intervention throughout the acute stage of the Korean crisis. It will focus on their concepts regarding negotiation and political settlement, their thoughts on military retaliation and economic sanctions, as well as other forms of ”punishment” against the ”aggressor.” In the end, it will delineate the problems in the policymaking process which made U.S.-PRC military confrontation inevitable.