Abstract
The U.S. criminal-justice system has consequentialist and retributivist goals: It considers what is best for society as well as how to punish people in a manner proportional to their crimes. In deciding on the degree of retribution that is called for, the system attempts to determine the blameworthiness—or culpability—of the people involved, weighing factors such as their ability to think rationality, their freedom from coercion, and whether their actions were out of character. These determinations hinge on social-scientific research that is not strong enough to justify such decisions. In this article, I challenge the social-scientific basis for determining culpability on three grounds: replicability, generalizability, and inferential strength. In light of the limitations of this research, I argue that the criminal-justice system should abandon its retributive goals and pursue a more consequentialist—and more reparative—form of justice.
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