Abstract
It is well documented that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. We experimentally test the robustness of this behavioral inertia in a collective decision-making setting by varying the default option type and the decision-making environment. We examine the impacts of automatic-participation and no-participation default options on subjects’ participation in a public goods provision and their contributions. Two variants of public goods game are employed: the linear and the threshold public goods games. The study shows the evidence of partial stickiness rather than complete stickiness of default options as indicated in empirical studies. Our experimental results square with the evidence of behavioral inertia only when the automatic-participation default is used. This default boosts contributions in the linear public goods game but not in the threshold public goods game. The evidence of partial stickiness is robust to the variation of the game employed, but the effect on contribution is sensitive to it.
Highlights
There is ample empirical evidence in the literature that people are reluctant to switch from a default option
We focus on two issues ; firstly, the incentive of subjects to switch from or to stay with the default options, and secondly, the impact of default options on contribution levels
In the opt-in treatment, the overwhelming majority of subjects (73.2 and 91.4% in the linear and threshold public goods games, respectively) do not stick to the default option and instead prefer to take an active decision to contribute. This result suggests that people did not always blindly follow the default option
Summary
There is ample empirical evidence in the literature that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. Following the spirit of Carroll et al (2009), we employ a hybrid-like system where both a default option and an active decision setting are present In this context, our paper can be seen as an attempt towards this research direction. Our paper can be seen as an attempt towards this research direction Another reason is that we would like to still maintain the voluntary nature of contribution in the opt-out treatment when subjects decide to stay with the default setting rather than arbitrarily imposing a certain level of contribution on them. This paper presents the sensitivity analysis of the impact of default participation option on the public goods contribution to the types of voluntary contribution games employed (i.e., the linear public goods game and the threshold public goods game).
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