Abstract

The established international 2°C target stipulates that global warming should be limited to below 2°C compared with pre-industrial periods; this has emerged as the most prominent interpretation of how to avoid dangerous climate change. The 2°C target was confirmed and made legally binding in the Paris agreement at the “climate summit” (Conference of Parties 21, COP21) in December 2015. But despite agreement on the target, greenhouse-gas emissions are unlikely to fall soon and fast enough to meet the target, raising the question of whether this target needs to be revised or reinterpreted, and also of why there is insufficient cooperation toward emissions reduction despite the risk of dangerous climate change. Previous theoretical and experimental research has suggested that cooperation towards emissions reduction is undermined by uncertainty about the threshold marking the transition to dangerous climate change. However, even if the threshold and hence the location of the target are known precisely, uncertainty ensues because of an unknown risk that arises from missing the collective target. How humans deal with this risk has not been investigated experimentally. Here we investigate how individuals behave under different risk scenarios if a collective target is missed. We perform economics experiments framed as a collective-risk social dilemma and directly examine the extent to which human subjects trade pay-out reduction for risk. We show that a reduced assessed risk arising from missing the collective target leads to reduced contributions towards the target; but that risk reduction causes the subjects almost to maximize their individual pay-out by balancing the effort to reach the target against the risk posed by missing it. We provide quantitative support for the argument that group contributions toward the collective target can be interpreted as proportional to mitigated warming. We conclude that reinterpretation of the 2°C target as less strict causes additional warming. However, our subjects deal effectively with a risk of dangerous climate change that they assess to depend gradually on global warming. Our results suggest that, if the additional warming is judged to be acceptable, a less strict interpretation of the 2°C target might support finding a trade-off between the effort put into climate mitigation and the risk of dangerous climate change.

Highlights

  • With the international climate negotiation process in mind, we here investigate by means of experimental economics how the assessment of the risk arising from missing a collective target, interpreted as the 2°C target, influences the effort undertaken by groups of subjects to reach the target

  • In Treatment 1 (T1) and Treatment 2 (T2) the expected winnings as a function of group investment over ten rounds are maximized at the target sum of €120 (Fig. 1d, e), whereas in Treatment 3 (T3) the maximum occurs at a group investment of €113.3 (Fig. 1f; see Methods in Supplementary Information)

  • The alternative risk scenarios that are represented by T2 and T3 in our experiments reinterpret rather than revise the 2°C target (Geden, 2013)

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Summary

Introduction

The 2°C climate target stipulates that globally averaged surface warming should be limited to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Rijsberman and Swart, 1990; WBGU, 1995; Ott et al, 2004; Tol, 2007; Ramanathan and Feng, 2008; Randalls, 2010; Cointe et al, 2011; Jaeger and Jaeger, 2011; Moellendorf, 2011). With the international climate negotiation process in mind, we here investigate by means of experimental economics how the assessment of the risk arising from missing a collective target, interpreted as the 2°C target, influences the effort undertaken by groups of subjects to reach the target.

Results
Conclusion
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