Abstract

The female preference hypothesis of lek evolution states that female tend to mate on large male aggregations because of the possibility to compare the qualities of potential mates. On the other hand, if female choice results in only males of highest quality being successful of each lek, the resulting skewed pattern of mating success leaves it unexplained why the lower ranking males agree to join the aggregation. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study the evolutionary stability of lekking in a case where females use the information provided by male competition as a cue for genetic quality. It is shown that female preference for large aggregations should be expected whenever the success in male contests is related to genetic quality, but the within-lek choosiness of females, revealed by an intense mating skew, limits the size of an evolutionary stable lek.

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