The Legitimacy of Provisional General Budget Laws in the Jordanian Legal System

Abstract

This study examines the legitimacy of the recurrent conduct, adopted by the Jordanian Executive Power, of issuing Provisional General Budget Laws, in the absence of the Legislative Power. This study proves the unconstitutionality of such conduct, and looks at the prospects of progress in the future. Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws is a culmination of several misconceptions of some important Constitutional Articles; especially the ones that reflect how the principle of separation of powers is adopted in the Jordanian Constitution, and how the different interlocking functions of both the Executive and the Legislative Powers should be interpreted and applied. Article 94, providing for the legislative function of the Executive Power in the absence of the Legislative Power, is interpreted and applied broadly. Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws mean that the Executive Power assumes the legislative Power and not a temporary legislative role, as provided in the Constitution. Hence, contradicting another two important systems provided therein: first, the financial check, as part of the checks and balances system, provided in Chapter Eight, especially Article 112. Second, the apportionment method, provided in Article 113, which should be applied in the absence of the Legislator. Unfortunately, the 2011 Constitutional Reform, although somewhat progressive, does not remove such well-rooted misconceptions; leaving the Constitutional Court as the last resort in rectifying the situation.