The Legitimacy Crisis of Arguments from Expert Opinion: Can’t We Trust Experts?

Abstract

Recent disputes (Mizrahi in Inform Logic 33(1):57–79, 2013; Mizrahi in Inform Logic 36(2):238–252, 2016; Mizrahi in Argumentation 32(2):175–195, 2018; Seidel in Inform Logic 34(2):192–218, 2014; Seidel in Inform Logic 36(2):253–264, 2016; Hinton in Inform Logic 35(4):539–554, 2015) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion (AEO) give rise to a potential legitimacy crisis of it. Mizrahi (Inform Logic 33(1):57–79, 2013; Inform Logic 36(2):238–252; Argumentation 32(2):175–195, 2018) claims that AEO are weak arguments by presenting two independent arguments. The first argument (i.e., the argument of unreliable experts) is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions p do not make p significantly more likely to be true. The second argument (i.e., the argument of biased experts) is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions are susceptible to the kinds of cognitive biases that novice opinions are susceptible to. In this paper, I intend to argue that Mizrahi’s two arguments both fail because of inconsistency, irrelevance, and insufficiency. Nevertheless, Mizrahi’s arguments help to evaluate AEO better by expanding the relevant critical questions.