Abstract

espanolWright y Apel pusieron de manifiesto como el positivismo logico de Russell y el primer Wittgenstein tuvo en la estricta separacion leibniziana entre lo analitico y lo sintetico una de sus muchas senas de identidad. Pero a su vez, ambos autores senalan como Wittgenstein y Popper se acabarian reprochando que sus respectivas propuestas acerca de la experiencia y del lenguaje cientifico adolecieran de una condicion de tipo oracular o simplemente ficcional, respectivamente, con posturas cada vez mas irreconciliables. Sin embargo las posteriores corrientes del positivismo logico, segun Wright y Apel, acabarian defendiendo un neodualismo postanalitico donde se sugeriria una posible integracion entre ambas propuestas, defendiendo una posible complementariedad entre la explicacion y la comprension, aunque desde planteamientos muy distintos. EnglishWright and Apel revealed as the logical positivism of Russell and the first Wittgenstein had in Leibniz’s strict separation between analytic and synthetic one of his many hallmarks. But in turn, both authors point out how Wittgenstein and Popper would end reproaching their respective proposals on the scientific language suffered from a condition of oracular type or just fictional, respectively, with increasingly irreconcilable positions. However current post of logical positivism, according to Wright and Apel, would end up defending a post-analytic dualism where possible integration between the two proposals suggest, advocating a possible complementarity between explanation and understanding, although from position very different.

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