The Least Dangerous Chair?

Abstract

power of the in multilateral negotiations, looking in particular at the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) (see, for example, Tallberg 2003, 2004). In a field that has traditionally been dominated by political practitioners and game theorists, Tallberg has developed an original perspective that draws on institutionalist approaches in political science. Most notably, whereas the dominant approaches tend to model negotiations as bargains between actors with comparable sets of resources under basic rules of exchange, Tallberg highlights how negotiations are actually meshed within a complex political context in which negotiation failure is rife and in which, hence, a demand for leadership emerges. Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union presents a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing leadership in multilateral negotiations. It then applies this framework in six case studies that analyze the role of recent EU presidencies on selected dossiers. Finally, the book assesses the generalizability of the findings to international negotiations beyond the EU. Tallberg's central theoretical claims are organized around the distinction between the demand for and the supply of leadership in international negotiations. With respect to the demand for leadership, he submits that it responds to the functional need to overcome the collective-action problems endemic in negotiations. With respect to the supply of leadership, Tallberg's key claim is that formal leaders in international negotiations enjoy distinctive informational and procedural powers that they can use, not only to further the successful outcome of the negotiations, but also to skew this outcome to fit their own preferences. In a historical chapter, Tallberg traces how European cooperation over time has given rise to ever more extensive demands for leadership. Initially, the European Commission was regarded as the institution best positioned to meet these demands. Over time, however, the expansion and institutionalization of the EU presidency has made it the premier source of leadership in the Union. The crucial turning point appears to lie around 1970, and Tallberg highlights two factors to account for this turn. First, on the supply-side, the Commission discredited itself by overplaying its hand in its relations with the member states. The Commission's weakness became particularly apparent in the empty chair crisis of 1965-1966. Second, on the demand-side, the proliferation of European cooperation required coordination by an actor who was well versed in the intricacies of intrastate policy coordination. As European cooperation moved into new spheres beyond its initial economic orientation, new forums (such as European Political Cooperation and the European Council) emerged that bypassed the Commission and in which leadership naturally