The Law and Economics of Online vs. Traditional Markets

Abstract

This symposium features papers from the third (and final) conference in the George Mason Law School/Microsoft conference series on the law and economics of innovation. The papers focus on the law and economics of online markets. There are, of course, obvious differences between the local grocery store and eBay, and between Google and the local Yellow Pages. The conference was convened to bring together scholars, regulators, policy experts and industry insiders to explore the nature of those differences and their implications, if any, for how online markets are organized and regulated. As reflected in these papers, our understanding of the functioning of online markets can be bolstered by an applied understanding of certain economic issues common to most markets. Most important for online markets among these are the economics of information and advertising, the economics of reputation and anonymity, the role of market norms, contract law and other institutions in governing relationships, the economics of networks, and the law and economics of intellectual property. To some extent all of these papers, and almost all discussions of online markets, take on the fundamental question of “online exceptionality”: do the essential characteristics of online markets render them different, susceptible to particular, identifiable abuses or defects, and thus amenable to more-intrusive or more-targeted regulation?