Abstract
OUR FEATURE ARTICLE highlighted the failure of recent attempts to shore up the psychoanalytic concept of the dynamic unconscious by invoking empirical evidence derived from cognitive science in favor of the cognitive unconscious. In fact, we argued that recent work in cognitive science suggests that it is time to dispense with the concept of the dynamic unconscious altogether. The responses to our arguments from our two commentators are representative of the schism that marks the contemporary assessment of Freudian psychoanalytic theory as a whole. Woody, on the one hand, is in substantial agreement with the position we develop, and spends his commentary developing further considerations as to why Freud and his followers got the unconscious so wrong. Kroll, on the other, claims that we have failed to show any incompatibility between the dynamic unconscious and the cognitive unconscious, and argues that the former still has an important role to play in the explanation of human motivation and behavior.
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