Abstract

Abstract : This paper focuses on one aspect of the negotiation process and the outcome of the Korean War Armistice Agreement (KWAA). The KWAA was signed on 27 July 1953 between the military commanders of the United Nations Command (UNC), the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA), and the Korean People's Army (KPA) of the Democratic People's of Republic of Korea (DPRK). Under the provisions of the KWAA, five Northwest Islands are specifically designated to remain under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, UNC. Because of the islands' unique strategic location, the surrounding area of the five islands became one of the primary potential sources of conflict between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the DPRK. There have been two recent violent naval engagements between the two Koreas, on 15 June 1999 and 29 June 2002, near those islands. Four key strategic issues this paper will focus on are as follows: why the UNC decided to retain those island groups among the many islands it held north of the military demarcation line prior to the Armistice Agreement; the strategic consequence of the negotiation and establishment of the Northern Limit Line (NLL); the lessons we can learn from the negotiations; and recommendations to policy makers.

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